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HOW EQUAL PROTECTION DID AND DID NOT 
COME TO THE UNITED STATES, AND THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH ROLE THEREIN 
 
LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN∗ 
What follows is an interbranch comparison of federal policy toward 
three racial groups in the United States—African Americans, Native Amer-
icans, and Asian Americans—during the four decades following the post-
bellum entrenchment of the right to “equal protection of the laws.”  It 
should be read as an extended, analytic commentary on the Timechart com-
pilation of policy developments in each branch of the federal government 
during these years, which is appended at the end of this Essay.  My analytic 
focus is on institutional forces that conduced to executive branch interven-
tion on behalf of racial minorities (or not).  This will be elaborated in the 
conclusion. 
I.  AFRICAN AMERICANS 
The Equal Protection Clause—meant to restrict racial discrimination—
entered the United States Constitution as one of several measures enacted 
by a Congress stripped of Southern representatives in the aftermath of the 
Civil War, and then imposed on the South as a condition for readmission 
into Congress.  During Reconstruction, Republicans used the military victo-
ry to coerce the Southern states into ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment, 
allowing suffrage for African Americans (via the Reconstruction Acts of 
1867–18681), and then into ratifying the Fourteenth (and, if not yet admit-
ted back to Congress by 1869, the Fifteenth) Amendment(s).  By the time of 
the 1874 election, this dominant national coalition of Republicans in the 
non-seceded states, combined with African American and white Republi-
cans in the South, no longer dominated either Congress or the national 
mood.  By this time, however, the rights had been formally entrenched at 
the national level. 
In this first post-bellum decade, the dongressional Republicans gave 
the nation the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments; the Civil 
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 1.  Ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428–30 (1867); ch. 5–6, 15 Stat. 2–5 (1867); ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14–16 
(1867); ch. 25, 15 Stat. 41 (1868). 
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Rights Act of 1866;2 a treaty in 1866 that freed all slaves owned by the 
Cherokee;3 the Reconstruction Acts of 1867–1868;4 the Enforcement Act of 
1870;5 the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871;6 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875.7  
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was pushed through a lame duck Congress—a 
Congress having gone Democratic in the election of 1874—and was filibus-
tered until its most controversial provision, the desegregation of public 
schools, was dropped.8  While this Act did squeak through the lame duck 
Republican House early in 1875, its day (except for the jury provision) had 
already come and gone.9  It passed the House (162 to 99) only with the 
votes of ninety Republicans who had just been ousted from office.10 
In the election of 1874, the American electorate basically turned its 
back on Reconstruction, changing the House of Representatives from a two-
thirds Republican majority to a Democratic majority.11  In the election of 
1876, after a commission sorted through disputes over election numbers, 
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes was given the Electoral College by one 
vote, despite a clear majority by Democrat Samuel Tilden in the popular 
vote.12  In 1876, the Democrats retained their House majority and came 
within three of tying the Republican majority in the Senate; in the 1878 
election, the Democrats surpassed the Republicans in both houses.13  The 
national mood had plainly shifted by the time of the 1874 elections, and the 
                                                          
 2.  Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27–30 (1866). 
 3.  Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 500 (1896) (stating that petitioner “became a citi-
zen of the Cherokee Nation under the ninth article of the treaty of 1866, 14 Stat. 799, 801, by 
which the Cherokee Nation agreed to abolish slavery”). 
 4.  See supra note 1. 
 5.  Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140–46 (1870). 
 6.  Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13–15 (1871). 
 7.  Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335–37 (1875). 
 8.  Alfred H. Kelly, The Congressional Controversy over School Segregation, 1867–1875, 
64 AM. HIST. REV. 537, 555–56 (1959). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 
68 (2011). 
 11.   Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 
115, 125–33 (1994) (describing the election as a “mobilized deliberation” and a forgotten “consti-
tutional moment”). 
 12.  ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 
575–76 (1988) (discussing the “electoral crisis” that resulted from the 1876 election); XI WANG, 
THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN REPUBLICANS, 1860–1910, at 
148–49 (1997). 
 13.  SAMUEL KERNELL & GARY C. JACOBSON, THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 575 (2d 
ed. 2003). 
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shift endured long enough to let the Democrats control both houses of Con-
gress by 1879.14 
The executive branch shifted in a similar direction but far less abrupt-
ly.  The President, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and federal troops 
acted against the massive violent resistance in Southern states by suspend-
ing the writ of habeas corpus in nine South Carolina counties in 1871,15 
bringing hundreds of prosecutions annually from 1871 through 1877, and 
then again during the Garfield-Arthur administration of 1881-1885.16  Dur-
ing 1878, President Hayes’s first full calendar year in office, there was a 
brief dip in prosecutions, apparently reflecting his effort to attempt to let 
Southern officials provide “‘harmony and good feeling,’” as leaders such as 
Wade Hampton had promised they would if the federal troops withdrew 
from the South.17  By October 1878, President Hayes had received enough 
reports of electoral violence in South Carolina and Texas that he decided to 
make “‘a clear, firm and accurate statement of the facts as to Southern out-
rages.’”18  The next year his administration quadrupled the number of pros-
ecutions, from twenty-three to ninety-three.19  The intensity with which the 
Democratic party opposed these measures shows up in the low enforcement 
year of 1880, after the Democrats briefly took control of Congress.20  Dur-
ing the 1879–1880 Congress, President Hayes vetoed no fewer than eight 
efforts (by Democrats) to repeal the voting rights enforcement laws.21  
Congress refused to appropriate any funds at all for federal marshals in the 
fiscal year July 1, 1879, through June 30, 1880, because of antipathy toward 
their role in voting rights enforcement.22 
                                                          
 14.  Id.  Voting figures after 1872 and until well into the twentieth century cannot give a 
complete picture of national sentiment because of the role played by white violence to keep Afri-
can Americans and their white sympathizers from the polls in the South once the Democrats had 
“redeemed” it.  See infra notes 43–47. 
 15.  See FONER, supra note 12, at 454–58; LOU FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH 
CAROLINA KU KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 1871–1872, at 39, 45–48 (1996). 
 16.  See Graph, infra p. 193. 
 17.  WANG, supra note 12, at 152–53; see also RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE 
NEGRO: FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES TO WOODROW WILSON 12–36 (Da Capo Press 1997) 
(1965) (discussing the “let alone” policy of Hayes toward the South during his presidency). 
 18.  WANG, supra note 12, at 161. 
 19.  Id. at 148, 161. 
 20.  See Graph, infra p. 193. 
 21.  LOGAN, supra note 17, at 32. 
 22.  Charles Fairman, 7 Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864–1888, Pt. II, in OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S. (1987). 
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Democrat Grover Cleveland won the popular vote for President in 
1884, 1888, and 1892 (although in 1888, Republican Benjamin Harrison 
took the Electoral College).23  In 1889, however, the Republicans returned 
to control, for a two-year interlude, both Houses of Congress and the Presi-
dency.24  Republicans Henry Cabot Lodge (Mass.) in the House and George 
F. Hoar (Mass.) in the Senate struggled mightily to pass a bill that would 
create federal supervisors to observe voter registration and guard against 
fraud at the ballot box.25  The bill passed the House.26  The Democratic 
Senate minority then used the following tactics to stall and eventually de-
feat the bill in the lame duck session (the Republicans having lost the House 
again in the 1890 election): (1) a filibuster; (2) a mass Democratic walkout 
to prevent a quorum; and (3) Democratic success (by a one-vote margin) at 
changing the subject.27  The thirty-five votes to change the subject included 
five Silverite Republicans (two each from Colorado and Nevada, and Wil-
liam D. Washburn from Minnesota28) and Senator Simon Cameron of Penn-
                                                          
 23.  KERNELL & JACOBSON, supra note 13, at 578–79. 
 24.  BRANDWEIN, supra note 10, at 182. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. (“The bill passed the House on July 2, 1890, but in the Senate Democrats and western 
“silver” Republicans joined forces to hold it over until the next session.”). 
 27.  Id. at 182–85. 
 28.  William Drew Washburn, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000175 (last visited Aug. 
26, 2013). 
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sylvania, a business-oriented Republican who was heavily involved in sil-
ver speculation.29  In 1891, House Republicans (now in a decided minority) 
abandoned their efforts to protect African American voters. 
Along with Democratic President Grover Cleveland, the election of 
1892 brought in two Democratic congressional chambers.30  In 1894, the 
party took advantage of this situation by rescinding almost all provisions of 
the Reconstruction voting rights enforcement acts.31  The Republicans, hav-
ing dropped the civil rights issue and being completely absorbed with pro-
tecting business interests against the rising labor and populism movements, 
did not filibuster.32 
The Administration of (Republican) President Theodore Roosevelt 
provides a limited exception to the otherwise dismal picture for African 
American civil rights that prevailed between 1885 and 1910.  Without tak-
ing on a recalcitrant Congress, President Roosevelt used his DOJ in 1901-
1909 to prosecute Klan-type mobs that were terrorizing African Americans 
into abandoning their jobs;33 to prosecute and convict a Floridian who vio-
lated the 1867 federal anti-peonage law;34 to produce an amicus brief en-
dorsing the petition for habeas corpus of an African American man arrested 
under a peonage statute of Alabama;35 to prosecute members of a lynch 
mob for violating Sections 5508 and 5509 of the Revised Statutes of 
1901;36 and to successfully prosecute contempt of court charges against a 
                                                          
 29.  James Donald Cameron, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=c000065 (last visited Aug. 
26, 2013). 
 30.  KERNELL & JACOBSON, supra note 13, at 578–79. 
 31.  BRANDWEIN, supra note 10, at 182–85; Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (1894). 
 32.  BRANDWEIN, supra note 10, at 185. 
 33.  Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 2–4 (1905), overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Pamela S. Karlan, Contracting the Thirteenth Amendment: 
Hodges v. United States, 85 B.U. L. REV. 783, 785–90 (2005); Owen M. Fiss, Troubled Begin-
nings of the Modern State, 1888–1910, in 8 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 379–84 (1993).  For the descriptions of the 1903 
prosecutions of United States v. Morris and United States v. Maples, see Timechart, infra pp. 216–
26.  The latter conviction of Maples was overturned by the Fuller Court in Hodges v. United 
States.  See Hodges v. United States, ENCYLOPEDIA OF ARKANSAS HISTORY AND CULTURE, 
http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry–detail.aspx? 
entryID=7404  (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).  The Fuller Court overturned a similar set of Roosevelt 
Administration criminal convictions in 1907 on the same grounds.  See, e.g., Boyett v. United 
States, 207 U.S. 581, 581 (1907) (per curiam). 
 34.  See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 219 (1905) (“The indictment charges that the 
defendant did ‘unlawfully and knowingly return one Will Gordon and one Mose Ridley to a con-
dition of peonage, by forcibly and against the will of them, the said Will Gordon and the said 
Mose Ridley, to work to and for Samuel M. Clyatt.’”). 
 35.  Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 452–53 (1908). 
 36.  Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547, 550 (1905).  Section 5508 reads: 
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white sheriff, deputy, and lynch mob members who cooperated in lynching 
an African American man whose appeal they knew was pending in the Su-
preme Court.37 
President Roosevelt’s DOJ also entered two cases to support treaty 
rights of Native Americans against infringements by states and negotiated 
access to “white” schools for Japanese-Americans in California, although at 
the cost of limiting Japanese immigration.38  Apart from the diplomatic ef-
forts on behalf of these Japanese residents, President Roosevelt limited his 
minority-protective efforts to his DOJ, and they are modest in comparison 
to Republican efforts of the post-bellum decade. 
Moreover, the Fuller Court thwarted most of President Roosevelt’s 
DOJ prosecutions and amicus briefs on behalf of African American civil 
rights.39  The sole exception seemed to be on the topic of lynch mob mur-
ders, which intrinsically posed a threat to judicial prerogatives.  The Fuller 
Court refused to allow a habeas petition from a man held in jail pending tri-
al for a lynching that resulted in murder.40  Additionally, it not only upheld 
the power of a circuit court to issue contempt charges for knowingly lynch-
ing an African American man whose appeal challenging a rape conviction 
was pending in the United States Supreme Court,41 but also tried the partic-
                                                          
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in 
the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or if 
two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with 
intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so se-
cured, they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more 
than ten years; and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of 
honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
Hodges, 203 U.S. at  5. 
Section 5509 reads: 
If, in the act of violating any provision in either of the two preceding sections, any other 
felony or misdemeanor be committed, the offender shall be punished for the same with 
such punishment as is attached to such felony or misdemeanor by the laws of the state 
in which the offense is committed. 
United States v. Mason, 213 U.S. 115, 119 (1908) 
 37.  United States v. Shipp (I), 203 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1906); United States v. Shipp (II), 214 
U.S. 386, 386–87 (1909). 
 38.  See infra Parts II–III. 
 39.  In Clyatt, the Court reversed and remanded the peonage conviction claiming technical 
problems with the indictment.  197 U.S. at 22 (1905).  In Hodges and Boyett, the Court ruled that 
private persons cannot be punished by the federal government for violent intimidation used to 
drive African Americans out of desirable jobs.  Hodges, 203 U.S. at 19–20; Boyett v. United 
States, 207 U.S. 581, 581 (1907).  In Bailey, it rejected the arguments of the Roosevelt Admin-
istration’s amicus brief, refusing to issue a writ of habeas corpus to an African American man 
jailed for violating an Alabama peonage statute.  211 U.S. at 452–53. 
 40.  Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547, 551 (1905). 
 41.  Shipp (I), 203 U.S. at 575. 
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ipants and found them (a sheriff, a deputy, and four members of the mob) in 
contempt of court.42 
An unremitting campaign of violence, fraud, and intimidation kept 
many African Americans in the South from voting in the half-century fol-
lowing the Civil War, at the cost of many lives.  During this time, there was 
also an epidemic of public lynching in the South.  Between 1885 and 1900, 
2,500 persons were lynched in the United States, mostly in the South; the 
great majority of those lynched were African American.43  Yet, starting 
with Mississippi in 1890, the state-level legislative changes that spread 
across the South in a twenty-year period were most effective in shaping 
election results.44  After Mississippi, the following states were affected by 
these legislative changes: South Carolina in 1895; Louisiana in 1898; North 
Carolina in 1900; Alabama in 1901; and Virginia in 1902.45  By 1910, all 
eleven of the former Confederate states, as well as Oklahoma, had legislat-
ed restrictions producing African American disenfranchisement.46  These 
eventually disenfranchised nearly all the Southern African American vot-
ers.47 
The judicial branch in this time period essentially followed the pace of 
the executive branch as opposed to the legislative branch.  The Chase Court 
(which lasted until 1873) and the Waite Court (1874–1888) proved moder-
ately protective of civil rights of African Americans.  Both Courts trimmed 
the Fourteenth Amendment and some Reconstruction legislation by inter-
preting them narrowly in cases such as Blyew v. United States,48 the Slaugh-
terhouse Cases,49 United States v. Cruikshank,50 the Civil Rights Cases,51 
                                                          
 42.  Shipp (II), 214 U.S. at 403–05, 425. 
 43.  JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A 
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 312 (7th ed. 1994). 
 44.  J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS 
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 139–42 (1974). 
 45.  LOGAN, supra note 17, at 348. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  80 U.S. 581 (1872).  The Court construed the limiting term “affecting persons,” from the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 3, as not applying to African Americans who were simply denied the 
right to give evidence as witnesses, but as applying only to the parties to a suit—defendants or 
litigants.  Id. at 590–94.  The section removed into federal jurisdiction all “‘causes, civil and crim-
inal,’ . . . ‘affecting persons who are denied, or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of 
the State, or locality, where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section of 
the act,’” among which rights are the right to give evidence and the right to have full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens.  Id. at 590–91. 
 49.  83 U.S. 36, 74–81 (1873) (construing the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause narrowly, to include only such privileges as derived from the national character of the 
Constitution, such as the right to travel freely among the states). 
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and United States v. Harris.52  The Waite Court used the federal commerce 
power to declare void a state law desegregating common carriers within the 
state that moved in interstate commerce.53  The Waite Court also declared 
unconstitutional a few sections of civil rights acts in a way that left them 
easily amendable to pass judicial muster, politics permitting.54 
Both the Chase and Waite Courts, however, also upheld civil rights 
principles in important cases.  The Chase Court rejected a railway compa-
ny’s claim that providing (physically) identical but separate cars for differ-
ent races amounted to equal treatment in satisfaction of District of Colum-
bia law.55  Similarly, the Waite Court: (1) expanded the reach of the 
Fifteenth Amendment by interpreting it to contain no state action limit on 
federal enforcement legislation in spite of its language;56 (2) upheld a state-
                                                          
 50.  92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1876) (construing the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly, to prohibit 
a State from “depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” and 
from denying any person “the equal protection of the laws,” but noting that the Amendment “adds 
nothing to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another,” and insisting 
that indictments for violating the Fifteenth Amendment, Thirteenth Amendment, or the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 implementing the Thirteenth, had to include an element of discrimination 
based on race or previous servitude). 
 51.  109 U.S. 3, 11–14, 21–22 (1883) (construing the Fourteenth Amendment as applying on-
ly to situations of state wrongdoing, not defining the licensing of inns and common carriers as ex-
amples of state action, and interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment “badges of servitude” as not 
extending to the Jim Crow system). 
 52.  106 U.S. 629 (1883).  The Court in Harris narrowly construed the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: “[W]hen . . . the laws of the state, as enacted by its legislative, and construed by its judicial, 
and administered by its executive departments, recognize and protect the rights of all persons, the 
[Fourteenth] amendment imposes no duty and confers no power upon Congress . . . [to] add any-
thing to the rights of one citizen as against another.”  Id. at 638–39. 
 53.  Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488–89 (1878). 
 54.  See Harris, 106 U.S. at 640–41.  In Harris, the Court held that Section 5519 of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871 was unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress’s powers, was not war-
ranted by the Fourteenth Amendment since it criminalized private action even when states acted 
properly, and was not warranted by the Thirteenth Amendment due to its overbreadth: it “covers 
any conspiracy between two free white men against another free white man to deprive the latter of 
any right accorded him by the laws of the state or of the United States.”  Id. This quote in fact de-
scribes the situation in Harris even though the Court did not expressly note it.  See BRANDWEIN, 
supra note 10, at 153–60; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13–15 (holding that Sections 1 and 
2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress’s powers 
and they were not warranted by the Fourteenth Amendment since they penalized private action 
even when states acted properly); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220–21 (1875) (holding 
that Sections 3 and 4 were unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment powers 
because they did not state clearly enough that they apply only to interferences with the vote on 
specifically racial grounds). 
 55.  Railroad Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. 445, 452–53 (1873) (noting that the legal requirement 
that the railroad not discriminate by race is violated by placing the races in separate cars, even 
though the cars were identical). 
 56.  Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884) (“In such cases [where state law limited 
voting rights to whites, the Fifteenth] amendment does, proprio vigore, substantially confer on the 
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law-based damages award against a white café owner for refusing to serve 
an African American customer;57 (3) upheld several attacks on racial dis-
crimination in jury selection; and (4) upheld Section 4 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, which banned such discrimination.58 
The Court under Chief Justice Fuller (1888–1910),59 who was appoint-
ed by the first post-bellum Democratic president, Grover Cleveland, was a 
different story.  It flatly rejected the civil rights advances of the two previ-
ous Supreme Courts.60  Its “separate but equal” ruling in Plessy v. Fergu-
son61 contradicted the reasoning of the Chase Court from Railroad v. Brown 
and the state action reasoning from the Waite Court Civil Rights Cases.62  
                                                          
negro the right to vote, and [C]ongress has the power to protect and enforce that right.”); United 
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555–56 (1876) (noting that the Fifteenth Amendment confers 
on Congress the power to protect the right to be free of race discrimination in voting). 
 57.  Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92–93 (1875). 
 58.  See Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 122–23 (1883) (quashing indictment for murder of 
an African American man accused of killing a white girl on grounds that African Americans had 
been excluded from consideration for grand jury service, pursuant to state law in force at time of 
the indictment); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397–98 (1881) (rejecting as beyond credibility 
the claim of Delaware officials that zero of the 26,000 African American residents “were utterly 
disqualified, by want of intelligence, experience, or moral integrity, to sit on juries,” and setting 
aside the conviction for murder as having resulted from unconstitutional and unlawful jury-
selection procedure); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348–49 (1880) (upholding, under Section 4 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, the in-
dictment, arrest, and imprisonment of a state judge for excluding African Americans from jury 
lists); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (declaring unconstitutional, as a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause, a state law limiting jury service to white male adults). 
 59.  Chief Justice Melville Fuller was a former campaign manager for Senator Stephen Doug-
las.  As an Illinois legislator, Fuller had introduced a bill endorsing a constitutional amendment to 
overturn the Emancipation Proclamation and guarantee slavery against federal intervention.  J. 
Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN 
MINORITY VOTING: A TWENTY-FIVE YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, 
at 135–76 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1992). 
 60.  Additionally, while Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878), was not a civil rights advance, 
its logic should have led to a rule that state laws imposing racial separation on common carriers 
that travel interstate also violate the federal commerce power.  The Fuller Court ruled to the con-
trary in 1890 in Louisville, New Orleans, and Texas Railway v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890), 
and again ten years later in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900). 
 61.  163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a state law requiring common carriers to place African 
Americans and whites into separate but equal cars). 
 62.  See supra notes 51 and 54.  In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court reasoned that if state law 
discriminated on the basis of race, this would violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause.  109 U.S. 3, 13–15 (1883).  In Railroad Co. v. Brown, the Court reasoned that placing rac-
es into separate, albeit identical, railroad cars violated a legal rule against racial discrimination by 
the carrier.  84 U.S. 445, 452–53 (1873).  For Fuller Court decisions that extended Plessy v. Fer-
guson to state laws requiring racial separation in schools and colleges, see Cummings v. Richmond 
(Georgia) Cnty. Bd. of Education, 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899), ruling that Richmond’s decision to 
close its public high school for African American students, while continuing to run a public high 
school for white females and to subsidize a public high school for white male students, did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause, and Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 69–70 (1908), 
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The Fuller Court’s many rulings on claims of racial exclusion in juries from 
1891-1909 demonstrated its refusal to set aside convictions of African 
Americans irrespective of egregiously biased jury selection patterns,63 fla-
grantly flouting the logic of Neal v. Delaware.64  In 1903, the Fuller Court 
put a state action requirement back into the Fifteenth Amendment, ignoring 
prior reasoning to the contrary by the Waite Court in Cruikshank and Yar-
borough.65  In the voting deprivation cases, Williams v. Mississippi66 and 
Giles v. Harris,67 the Court flouted the rule from the Waite Court’s Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins68 decision that the racially biased administration of a facially 
neutral law is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause69 (despite 
lip service to Yick Wo in Williams).70  This last set of decisions opened the 
floodgates to massive African American disfranchisement across the entire 
former Confederacy; however, the decisions did not arise until Congress, 
                                                          
upholding a Kentucky prohibition against any private corporations that operated a school where 
white and colored children received instruction together at the same time and place. 
 63.  E.g., Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591–92 (1896) (refusing to undo conviction of 
African American defendant and remove proceeding to federal court, although county listed no 
African American jurors for years, and county population was more than three-fourths African 
American); see also Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The 
Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1455–72; Fairman, supra note 
22, at 373 n.76. 
 64.  103 U.S. 370.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text; Timechart, infra pp. 216–26. 
 65.  See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1902) (“[A] statute which purports to punish 
purely individual action cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of the power conferred by 
the 15th Amendment upon Congress to prevent action by the state through some one or more of its 
official representatives.”); see also supra note 56. 
 66.  170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898) (refusing to quash indictment of an African American defend-
ant because, despite the all-white composition of the grand jury in a state where seventy-three per-
cent of the voters had recently been African American, and despite statutes recently adopted that 
had the impact of drastically restricting suffrage for African Americans and that required eligibil-
ity to vote as a prerequisite for jury duty, it had “not been shown that [these statutes’] actual ad-
ministration was evil; only that evil was possible under them”). 
 67.  189 U.S. 475, 482–88 (1903) (refusing to declare the Mississippi voting law unconstitu-
tional either per se or as administered, despite being shown a fact pattern as egregious as that of 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, in which massive numbers of African Americans were refused the right to 
register to vote during a grace period prior to a drastic restriction of eligibility, while all the whites 
who applied to register during this period were permitted to do so).  Follow-up efforts by Giles 
and African Americans involved in a parallel situation in Virginia also failed to bring rectification 
from the Fuller Court.  See Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 166–67 (1904) (refusing to grant either 
damages or a writ of mandamus to correct alleged mass violations of the Fifteenth Amendment by 
Alabama voting registrars); Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147, 152–53 (1904) (rejecting an appeal 
from African Americans alleging a wrongfully conducted election under a wrongfully adopted 
1901 Constitution of Virginia on the grounds that the congressional election of 1902 was complet-
ed, rendering the case moot). 
 68.  118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 69.  Id. at 373–74. 
 70.  Williams, 170 U.S. at 223–24 (acknowledging that racially biased administration of a law 
is unconstitutional). 
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with presidential approval, had already overturned most of the Reconstruc-
tion era voting rights protection acts in 1894.71 
II. NATIVE AMERICANS 
At least briefly, the post-bellum Congress of the non-seceded states 
showed support for other racial minorities beyond the former slaves, specif-
ically Native Americans and Chinese Americans.  Both proponents and op-
ponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 interpreted the language of the bill, 
once enacted, as giving birthright citizenship to persons of Chinese descent 
(and other non-whites) and to those Native Americans who lived away from 
tribal governments and among white Americans.72  The same understanding 
extended to its paraphrase of the birthright citizenship clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.73  The favorable post-bellum sentiment toward Native 
Americans even received an embrace from President Andrew Johnson 
(Democratic Unionist, elevated to presidency by the assassination of his 
predecessor).  In 1866, he signed a ratified treaty with the Cherokee Tribe 
to undo an 1846 decision of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roger 
Taney that insisted on reading an earlier treaty as not giving the Cherokee 
the power to adopt whites into the tribe to the extent of having criminal ju-
risdiction over them.74  Even the exemptions preventing Native Americans 
on tribal reservations from attaining birthright citizenship under the 1866 
Civil Rights Act75 or the Fourteenth Amendment,76 and their exemption 
from the group accorded rights listed in Section 16 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1870,77 can be viewed as supportive of tribal sovereignty; off-reservation 
                                                          
 71.  Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (1894). 
 72.  Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Jr., Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 Cal L. Rev. 662, 671–75 (1975) (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 498 (1866) (regarding Chinese people born in the United States and “domesticated” Na-
tive Americans who “live in civilized society”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866) 
(regarding “every person of every color”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 572 (1866) (re-
garding “Indians not taxed”)). 
 73.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 74.  Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 379–81 (1896) (noting the existence of the treaty).  The 
Taney Court decision occurred in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846). 
 75. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27–30 (1866) (“excluding Indians not taxed” and thereby excluding them 
from the Act’s list of citizen rights). 
 76.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (granting citizenship rights only to persons born in the 
United States who were “subject to the jurisdiction thereof”). 
 77.  Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (“Sec. 16. . . . [A]ll 
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and 
Territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and 
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as 
is enjoyed by white citizens. . . .”). 
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Native Americans were meant to be covered rather than exempted by these 
provisions.78 
Additionally, in two 1866 cases the post-bellum Supreme Court exhib-
ited some brief support for Native Americans by striking down state tax 
laws (of Kansas and New York) that infringed upon prior national treaties 
with certain tribes.79  Here, the Court followed the tradition of Chief Justice 
John Marshall by upholding national power (to make treaties) against state 
infringements thereon, to the benefit of Native American tribes.80 
A period of wars between the U.S. Cavalry and Native American 
tribes ensued from 1866 until 1890 due, in part, to the ever-growing move-
ment of the white population westward in search of opportunities in fur-
trading, mining, farming, and ranching.81  Some of the sporadic violent con-
flicts were caused by the drastic (and wasteful) depletion of buffalo by 
whites to the extent that Native Americans raided white settlements to avoid 
starvation; but an additional source of conflict was the massive degree of 
fraud perpetrated against Native American tribes.82 
President Grant and President Hayes both attempted to mitigate this 
problem by attacking the corruption among Indian agents of the govern-
ment.  Beginning in 1869, President Grant turned specifically to two 
measures to clean up corruption and malfeasance by the Indian agents.  
First, the President established a ten-member Board of Indian Commission-
ers, comprised of respected philanthropists who would exercise oversight 
over the Indian agents and political relations with the tribes.83  Second, all 
Indian agents would be replaced by individual missionaries selected from a 
variety of Christian denominations.84  The goal was to turn away from the 
policy of separation, which kept producing outbreaks of warfare (costly in 
                                                          
 78.  See supra note 72; see also infra note 99. 
 79.  The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 737 (1866); The New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 761 
(1866). 
 80.  See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 555–57 (1832) (ruling that federal treaties 
with, and national laws concerning, Native Americans supersede any contrary state law: “The 
treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated 
from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively 
by the government of the union.”). 
 81.  PAUL BOYER ET AL., THE ENDURING VISION: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
503–14 (2008). 
 82.  Id.  From 1872 to 1875, white hunters killed millions of bison, took their skins for com-
mercial use, and left the bodies to rot.  Id. at 501–02. 
 83.  DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: 
THE MAKING OF JUSTICE 52 (1997). 
 84.  Id. 
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lives and resources), toward a policy of Christianizing Native Americans 
and teaching them how to survive by farming.85 
Grant called this new approach his “Peace Policy.”86  He believed that 
the only alternative to the Peace Policy was the “extinction of a race,” 
which would be an appalling alternative to “all Christendom.”87 
Although Grant’s Peace Policy continued through the term of Presi-
dent Hayes, any other show of congressional or presidential support for Na-
tive American sovereignty was short-lived.  Under pressure from western-
ers, such support dissipated even before the public turned away from 
Reconstruction.  By 1871, Congress legislated that treaties would no longer 
deal with tribes.88  In the same year, the executive branch decision to inter-
pret a federal tax law as having implicitly overridden a quite explicit Cher-
okee treaty provision to the contrary was upheld by the Supreme Court.89 
From 1871 through the first decade of the twentieth century, the fate of 
Native Americans worsened greatly, primarily due to the policies of the 
1887 Dawes Act and 1898 Curtis Act to sell tribal lands in efforts to lure 
Native Americans to live non-tribally and as individual farmers or in 
towns.90  The policies started benevolently (albeit misguidedly) but, in time, 
became infested with fraud, resulting in widespread and severe impover-
ishment of Native Americans.91  Whites, not Native Americans on the res-
ervations, were the ones who voted; and both Congress and the President 
responded to their constituency on this matter.92  There was no substantial 
political constituency who favored leaving a third of the continental United 
States in control of Native Americans. 
In this political setting, the Supreme Court varied its approach more 
than Congress did.  In the 1880s, the moderately rights-protective Waite 
Court93 was able to intervene once, when the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(“BIA”) attempted to impose federal criminal law on reservations before 
                                                          
 85.  Id. at 51–52; FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE 
THE INDIANS 1880–1920, at 2–3 (1984). 
 86.  WILKINS, supra note 83, at 52; HOXIE, supra note 85, at 3. 
 87.  Ulysses S. Grant, State of the Union Address (Dec. 6, 1869), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29510 (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
 88.  Ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (“[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the terri-
tory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or 
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty . . . .”). 
 89.   The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 618–21 (1871) (ruling that the 1868 federal tax on 
any “tobacco . . . within the exterior boundaries of the United States” superseded the guarantee in 
the 1866 Cherokee Treaty that Cherokee could sell any farm products free from federal taxation). 
 90.  HOXIE, supra note 85, at 78, 154. 
 91.  Id. at 30–38. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See supra notes 48–58 and accompanying text. 
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Congress had acted.  In this 1883 decision, the Court insisted that this (es-
sentially ultra vires) action violated treaties and had not been authorized by 
Congress.94  Congress, however, was free to override the effect of the deci-
sion by simply legislating what the BIA wanted, and it did so in the Major 
Crimes Act of 1885,95 which the Court then promptly upheld in Kagama v. 
United States.96  Similarly, the not particularly rights-protective Fuller 
Court intervened on behalf of Native Americans in 1905 when it declared 
that a congressional ban on selling liquor to Native Americans, as applied to 
off-reservation Native Americans who held U.S. citizenship, was unconsti-
tutional.97  Congress responded with the Burke Act of 1906, which post-
poned for twenty-five years the citizenship that the Dawes Act would have 
granted.98 
Also, the Waite Court wavered in its commitment to the rights of Na-
tive Americans.  In 1884, despite readily available evidence that congres-
sional understanding in 1866 was to the contrary,99 the Court denied birth-
right citizenship, with its concomitant eligibility to vote, to a Native Ameri-
can born on a reservation within the United States who had moved to Oma-
ha where he first satisfied residency requirements and then attempted to 
vote.100  The majority of Justices ruled (7-2) that he would have to be natu-
ralized before he could be a citizen.101  In the 1887 Dawes Act, Congress 
overturned this judicial policy by granting citizenship to all Native Ameri-
                                                          
 94.  Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 558–59, 570–72 (1883) (ruling that the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs’s effort to displace tribal criminal jurisdiction and move it into federal courts violated 
the provision of Rev. Stat. § 2146, which exempts from the general jurisdiction of United States 
courts those criminal offences committed in Indian country by one Native American against the 
person or property of another, and offences committed in Indian country by a Native American 
who has been punished by the local law of the tribe). 
 95.  Major Crimes Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 342, 23 Stat. 385 (1885). 
 96.  118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 97.  In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 505–09 (1905) (ruling that “when the United States grants the 
privileges of citizenship to an Indian [as it had under the Dawes Act allotment process], gives to 
him the benefit of, and requires him to be subject to, the laws, both civil and criminal, of the state, 
it places him outside the reach of [Indian-specific] police regulations on the part of Congress”). 
 98.  Burke Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906). 
 99.  Senator Trumbull, floor manager of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (whose wording was later 
adapted for the Fourteenth Amendment) responded to the question of whether the Act would give 
birthright citizenship to Native Americans: “‘[I]t should apply to the Indians so far as those who 
are domesticated and pay taxes and live in civilized society are concerned.’” Greenfield & Kates, 
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tion . . . .”  Id. at 664 n.9. 
 100.  Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 95–96, 109 (1884). 
 101.  Id. at 109. 
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cans who take an allotment or take up life away from the tribe and adopt 
“habits of civilized life.”102 
As a general matter, when the President and Congress were united in a 
policy toward a quasi-foreign people (here Native Americans), courts had 
little authority.  Unlike Chief Justice Marshall, who at least had the decency 
to bemoan his lack of power in the face of unjust treatment of Native Amer-
icans,103 the Waite and Fuller Courts simply announced repeatedly that the 
political branches were within their authority when they decided that the na-
tional interest called for policy that broke with an earlier treaty.104 
The Supreme Court did have a role to play when the issue was a dis-
puted interpretation of the Constitution between tribe members and their 
tribal government.  For instance, in 1896 the Court ruled that the Bill of 
Rights does not restrain tribal governments, thereby demonstrating a meas-
ure of respect toward tribal sovereignty.105  The Court also had a role to 
play when Native Americans complained that a state law conflicted with 
their federal treaty.106  In the same year, the Fuller Court went against Na-
tive American interests by upholding a state regulation on hunting by tribes 
on unoccupied federal land within the state of Wyoming.107  This Ward v. 
Race Horse decision broke with the Marshall and Chase Courts’ patterns of 
striking down state laws that conflicted with federal Native American trea-
ties, and also defied President Cleveland’s DOJ.  The Fuller Court then cor-
rected its own pro-state-law pattern to uphold treaty rights during the ad-
ministration of President Teddy Roosevelt, whose DOJ challenged state 
                                                          
 102.  In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 492 (1905) (citing Section 6 of the Dawes Act: “[E]very Indian 
born within the territorial limits of the United States who has voluntarily taken up, within said lim-
its, his residence separate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of 
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 103.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15 (1831) (“If courts were permitted to indulge 
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 104.  See supra notes 89 and 96 and accompanying text. 
 105.  Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (noting that the Fifth Amendment limits the 
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 106.  See infra notes 107–108 and accompanying text. 
 107.  Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 514–15 (1896) (“The enabling act declares that the 
state of Wyoming is admitted on equal terms with the other states, and this declaration, which is 
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laws restricting treaty-protected tribal fishing and water rights in 1905 and 
1908.108 
III. CHINESE-AMERICANS AND OTHER ASIAN-AMERICANS 
The situation of Asians-Americans in the United States engaged presi-
dential support for a longer time and more thoroughly than the support 
shown to Native Americans.  President Grant and President Hayes had lim-
ited their efforts to cleaning up the behavior of Indian agents, and subse-
quent presidents did little for Native Americans apart from the occasional 
DOJ challenges to state laws that interfered with Native American-related 
treaties.109  In contrast, for about seventeen years after the Civil War, pro-
tection of the Chinese attracted a measure of presidential effort; this period 
was almost as long the presidential involvement in prosecuting attacks on 
African American voters.  Presidential efforts to assist Japanese persons on 
the west coast then emerged at the turn of the twentieth century under Pres-
ident Roosevelt’s Administration.110 
The President was responsible for negotiating the Burlingame Treaty 
of 1868, which gave China favored nation status and assured good treat-
ment to its tourists and residents in the United States.111  This transpired in 
the post-bellum atmosphere of benevolence toward racial minorities.  As 
previously noted, Congress knowingly phrased the birthright citizenship 
Section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its successor, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Section 1, to encompass Chinese persons and other non-
whites born in the United States.112  Congress also extended most of the cit-
izen rights from the 1866 Act to all “persons” in the 1870 Enforcement Act; 
the exceptions were the rights to buy, sell, and lease real property.113  As of 
1866, these rights had been guaranteed to all citizens on the same basis as 
they were guaranteed to “white citizens”; however, non-citizen residents 
who were neither of African descent nor “white” could not attain them as 
federal rights for the following reason: The Naturalization Act of 1870 in-
                                                          
 108.  Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1908) (noting that the federal treaty with 
Native Americans implicitly reserves to them the water rights in dispute and is supreme over state 
law to the contrary, irrespective of law admitting state into the Union “‘upon an equal footing with 
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 109.  See supra Part II. 
 110.  See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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cluded only whites and persons of African descent.114  In the immediate 
post-bellum years, the warm congressional feeling toward Chinese people 
was only temperately so.  And it cooled a few years before the President’s 
did. 
By 1879, citizens of western states, especially California, who were 
angry at the judicial striking down of numerous anti-Chinese-resident laws, 
managed to persuade Congress (by bipartisan majorities, but more Demo-
crat than Republican votes) to break with the Burlingame Treaty and to lim-
it Chinese laborer immigration.115  Republican President Hayes vetoed the 
bill, lamenting in his diary about American mistreatment of “other weaker 
races” as well, viz., “Negroes and Indians.”116 
Nonetheless, political feeling against Chinese workers in the West re-
mained so intense that both political parties rallied to the cause of limiting 
immigration.  In November of 1880, facing increasingly numerous anti-
Chinese riots in the western states, President Hayes negotiated a new treaty 
agreeing to “reasonable” limits on immigration; and the Senate ratified it.117  
In 1881, President Arthur publically endorsed the idea of a limit, but then 
vetoed, as too extreme, a congressional measure that would ban Chinese 
workers for the next twenty years.118  Congress tried again with a ten-year 
limit and Arthur signed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.119  This act also 
banned entry by wives of laborers and required a specially issued federal 
identification card for any Chinese person who wished to leave and then re-
enter the United States.120 
After 1881, no further executive branch action to protect resident Chi-
nese or Chinese citizens was taken in the period of this study.  Instead, 
Congress passed restriction after restriction (always applied to “laborers,” 
not professionals, merchants, students, or tourists) and made returns to the 
United States difficult (ostensibly in fear that new Chinese immigrants 
would enter with forged documents claiming to be returning).121  The Presi-
dent always signed these measures.  Indeed, just days before the November 
1884 election, President Arthur’s DOJ took a hard line, arguing against the 
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re-admission of Chew Heong, a Chinese laborer who had been a lawful 
U.S. resident at the time of the 1880 Treaty (allowing for “reasonable” 
regulations of Chinese laborers in the United States), but who had left the 
country prior to the enactment of the 1882 rule requiring a special identity 
card for re-entry.122  He had been outside the United States until September 
1884, so there was no procedure available by which he could have obtained 
the required re-entry identification card.123  The Supreme Court rejected the 
DOJ’s arguments and relied on the principle of interpreting law to conform 
to prior treaties whenever possible; thus, the Court found language in the 
1882 and 1884 exclusion acts to allow his entry.124 
In 1897, Republican President McKinley’s DOJ was no better.  In 
Wong Kim Ark,125 the DOJ argued against the citizenship of U.S.-born per-
sons of Chinese descent under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Supreme 
Court rejected the DOJ’s argument and acknowledged Wong Kim Ark’s 
citizenship.126  Wong Kim Ark was decided eleven years after the Dawes 
Act gave citizenship to Native Americans who lived off the reservation in 
“civilized” ways.127  The 1892 Geary Act, signed by Republican President 
Harrison, had imposed special restrictions on “persons of Chinese de-
scent.”128  For instance, Chinese people had to leave the United States if 
they could not prove to a judge that their residence in the United States was 
legal.129  Presumably, the 1898 decision in Wong Kim Ark rendered this part 
of the act unconstitutional as applied to American citizens. 
Then, in 1906, a diplomatic incident involving Japanese school chil-
dren in San Francisco brought about a brief flurry of presidential efforts to 
smooth the situation.  The Japanese government took offence when Japa-
nese children in San Francisco were segregated into public schools for Afri-
can American and Chinese American children.  Between 1906 and 1908, 
President Roosevelt and the State Department, with the concurrence of 
Congress, negotiated the “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” the upshot of which 
                                                          
 122.  Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 536–39 (1884). 
 123.  Id. at 538–39. 
 124.  Id. at 549–57 (noting that courts are obligated to interpret statutes, if at all possible, as not 
conflicting with prior treaties and that, so interpreted, various exceptions in the 1882 and 1884 
acts covered Heong and allowed for his re-entry). 
 125.  169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
 126.  Id. at 692–93 (ruling that so long as his parents were in the United States as residents, 
rather than on a temporary diplomatic mission of the Chinese government [which, under the reign-
ing legal fiction, would have put them on foreign soil], they were “subject to the jurisdiction” of 
the U.S. government and Wong Kim Ark was entitled to birthright citizenship under the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
 127.  See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
 128.  Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25, 25–26 (1892). 
 129.  KIM, supra note 120, at 21–23. 
 208 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:190 
was that Japan would stop sending laborers to the United States, but Japa-
nese and Korean schoolchildren already in California would be permitted to 
attend “white” schools.130 
But for the limited exception of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, from 
1882 until 1906 the only federal branch of government at all protective of 
Asian people in the United States was the judiciary; and it faced constraints 
similar to those it confronted on the subject of Native Americans.  While 
treaty law could not undo the Constitution on domestic matters, the trea-
tymaking authority of the President and Senate, and the congressional role 
in foreign policy, outranked judicial authority in policies concerning people 
outside the United States.  The Supreme Court could, however, play a role 
in protecting Chinese people once they were within the country: Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins131 announced that the Equal Protection Clause meant that state pol-
icy, whether legislative or administrative, could not discriminate against 
persons based on their nationality or race.132  In 1892, the Court overrode 
the decision of an immigration bureaucrat as to the admission of Chinese 
merchant Lau Ow Bew, insisting that the administrator misunderstood the 
relevant law.133  Congress stepped in relatively promptly, however, with the 
1894 Chandler Act,134 which eliminated judicial review of decisions by 
immigration bureaucrats over efforts by Chinese laborers to re-enter the 
country; such decisions could now be appealed only to the Secretary of the 
Treasury (later to the Secretary of Labor and Commerce135).  In 1895, the 
Supreme Court upheld this withdrawal of jurisdiction from Article III judg-
es,136 and it reiterated its position in challenges in 1904137 and 1905,138 as 
they applied to Chinese-descent persons claiming U.S. birthright citizenship 
and trying to re-enter the United States.  In 1908, however, the Court finally 
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announced that persons of Chinese descent claiming birthright U.S. citizen-
ship and being prevented from re-entering their country are entitled to a fair 
hearing on the subject of their citizenship and, if one is denied by immigra-
tion officials, they have a constitutional due process right to appeal to the 
federal judiciary via habeas corpus.139  In the same year, the Court injected 
due process into the rights of a U.S. resident alleged to be a Chinese laborer 
but claiming to be a student who was facing deportation.140  The Court in-
sisted that immigration officials allow this U.S. resident to present more ev-
idence before a district court judge than had theretofore been allowed.141 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Supreme Court support from 1868 to 1908 was more modest for Asian 
Americans and Native Americans than it was for African Americans be-
cause of the extensive authority that our constitutional system gives to the 
political branches when addressing issues concerning foreign or quasi-
foreign peoples.  Yet, support occasionally surfaced, particularly with re-
spect to checking abuse of administrative authority.  The Supreme Court’s 
freedom from having to run for re-election did apparently enable it to pro-
vide somewhat more support for racial minorities from 1868 to 1887 than is 
generally recognized, although this support utterly disappeared for African 
Americans from 1888 to 1908, when the Court was led by Chief Justice 
Fuller, a white supremacist.142  With the voting public repeatedly producing 
a divided government (or a Democratically controlled government) after 
1874, it was apparent to most federal office holders that significant numbers 
of northerners had come to agree that the South was justified in its re-
strictions of the civil rights of African Americans, and/or gave up opposing 
the intense (Southern) resistance to these rights because it was politically 
and financially costly not to do so.143  Under such circumstances, it was 
highly likely that Supreme Court Justices who had less commitment to civil 
rights than did the Waite Court would eventually be appointed . 
                                                          
 139.  Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 12–13 (1908) (ruling that fair hearing had been 
denied in the executive branch procedure and that Chin Yow could bring his case before the fed-
eral court). 
 140.  Liu Hop Fong v. United States, 209 U.S. 453, 456–60 (1908). 
 141.  Id. at 461–63 (blocking a deportation order of a Chinese person who had entered the 
United States on a lawful student visa, but was being ordered deported after a hearing by a U.S. 
commissioner, a district court judge’s decision based on reading the hearing transcript, and on an 
additional deposition from the commissioner; and ruling that the relevant statutory scheme re-
quired that, prior to deportation, such person is entitled instead to a full de novo hearing before a 
district court where he might present witnesses and other evidence). 
 142.  See supra Part I. 
 143.  See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
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It is worth asking, however, what prompted the lag time between con-
gressional abandonment of civil rights protection for African Americans in 
1875, and presidential abandonment of the matter after 1886?  For example, 
at the end of President Grant’s term of office, the Administration prepared 
for White League violence in the South during the 1876 elections by sta-
tioning 338 federal marshals in South Carolina, 166 in North Carolina, 745 
in Florida, and 840 in Louisiana.144  A moment’s reflection points to the 
fact that the President, unlike a senator or a representative, has a national 
constituency.  The President is the national face of the party and, as such, 
has an electoral incentive to court the whole nation; protection of voting 
rights in all parts of the country are therefore potentially of interest to the 
President.  Moreover, because his term of office was not coterminous with 
that of the House or with two-thirds of the Senate, the dramatic public shift 
in voter sentiment that showed up in the 1874 House election could not 
change the holder of the presidential office.  The popular vote did go 
against the Republicans in 1876, but the Electoral College system ended up 
with a deal that gave the presidency to the Republicans anyway.  The Re-
publicans managed to hold the presidency until 1884, despite apparent lack 
of voter support for Reconstruction, in part because its electoral constituen-
cy was carved up differently from that of the House of Representatives or 
Senate.  If the United States had something closer to a parliamentary sys-
tem, as advocated in recent decades by scholars such as James Sundquist 
and Sanford Levinson—a system that abandoned staggered terms of office 
and the separation of electoral constituency between the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches—elections would more efficiently translate majority will 
into public policy.145  As thinkers like President Madison warned, however, 
such systems offered greater potential for majority tyranny as well.146  The 
fact that the presidency has a constituency significantly different from that 
of the House of Representatives seems to have created incentives in the 
years 1874 through 1885 to protect the African American minority of voters 
from some of the crime to which they would otherwise have been subjected. 
                                                          
 144.  BRANDWEIN, supra note 10, at 130–31. 
 145.  See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICAN’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE 
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 229–33 (2012) (discussing the shifting meaning of “divided government” 
and the advantages of parliamentarianism); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN 
CORRECT IT) 25–78 (2006) (discussing the “significant distortions and outright failures of Ameri-
can politics” resulting from an “undemocratic legislative process”); JAMES SUNDQUIST, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 18–21 (1986) (discussing the ad-
vantages of a “parliamentary democracy” and incremental changes to improving a divided U.S. 
government). 
 146.  THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47–48 (James Madison), NOS. 49–51 (Alexander Hamilton or 
James Madison). 
 2013]        EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 211 
Similarly, the fact that the Senate electoral system was structured to be 
unable to respond immediately to political majority trends kept it relatively 
moderate on Reconstruction, such that it produced, in its role of approving 
or disapproving the President’s Supreme Court nominees, the relatively 
moderate Justices of the Waite Court who were in place until 1888.  After 
1888, the Court finally came to express the opposition to Reconstruction 
that appears to have prevailed with the voting public as early as 1874. 
In addition to providing a modicum of protection for African Ameri-
cans for a decade after the U.S. voting public had tired of the problem, the 
President also played a role: (1) during the late 1870s until the early 1880s, 
in moderating Congress’s inclination to deal harshly with the Chinese peo-
ple; and (2), from 1906 to 1908, in countering California’s hostility toward 
resident Japanese.147  Unlike individual representatives or senators, the 
President has a national electoral constituency and, as the human embodi-
ment of diplomatic ties to our allies, has an international diplomatic constit-
uency.  The former gave him freedom from the kind of regional anti-
Chinese hysteria that produced intense pressure on representatives and 
senators from the western states; the latter freed him (or perhaps cross-
pressured him) to offer modest support for the rights of Asian Americans in 
some of the years when Congress was happy to do the opposite.148  Again, 
the kind of policy reform advocated in some quarters, which would place 
the President into some sort of parliamentary system without a separate 
election, would seem to work against these mild liberating tendencies. 
Similarly, in a handful of cases around the turn of the twentieth centu-
ry, the DOJ went to court on behalf of Native American tribal treaty rights 
to natural resources that were being impeded by state-level law.149  In this 
time period, presidential administrations appeared unwilling to counter 
Congress on policy toward Native Americans, but were willing, at least oc-
casionally, to stand up for federal treaty prerogatives against attacks by in-
dividual states. 
Finally, despite Congress’s firm disposition to the contrary, there was 
a small but discernible resurgence of African American rights protection 
under President Roosevelt.  Some of the motivation appears to have been 
personal ideology.  As Governor of New York, Roosevelt oversaw desegre-
gation of the state’s public schools.150  Upon taking office in 1901, he pub-
licly invited eminent African American leader Booker T. Washington to 
                                                          
 147.  See supra Part III. 
 148.  See supra Part III. 
 149.  See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 150.  Slavery by Another Name: Teddy Roosevelt and Progressivism, PBS.ORG, 
http://www.pbs.org/tpt/slavery-by-another-name/themes/progressivism/ (last viewed Oct. 6, 
2013). 
 212 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:190 
dine in the White House, setting off a storm of Southern criticism; and he 
also appointed some African Americans to patronage positions that were 
under his control.151  During the Roosevelt presidency, the DOJ prosecuted 
white marauders who used violence to drive African Americans out of 
jobs;152 creditors who attempted to force African Americans into servitude 
to pay off debts;153 and a sheriff, his deputies, and private persons who co-
operated with and participated in lynch mobs.154  Even though President 
Roosevelt was more racially progressive than his immediate predecessors, 
he was far from a paragon of racial enlightenment.  After the election of 
1906 took place, President Roosevelt discharged three whole companies of 
African American soldiers, without benefit of courts martial, over an inci-
dent of interracial violence in Brownsville, Texas, on the grounds that they 
refused to testify against one another in the investigation.155  Nonetheless, 
to the degree that he was motivated to do so, the prerogatives of his office 
offered some space for policies more racially progressive than those Con-
gress would endorse at the time. 
Periodically, American political and legal scholars urge reconsidera-
tion and revision of those features of our electoral system intended to slow 
down the democratic juggernaut—separation of the policymaking branches 
and creation of differing electoral constituencies for each, as well as stag-
gered rather than coterminous terms of office.156  The account provided here 
perhaps offers the cautionary tale that, in at least one historical period, these 
inconvenient institutional features did function as designed—to mitigate the 
harshness of majority tyranny. 
                                                          
 151.   American President: Theodore Roosevelt: On Race and Civil Rights, MILLER CTR. OF 
THE UNIV. OF VIRGINIA, http://millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/essays/biography/4 (last 
viewed Oct. 6, 2013). 
 152.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 153.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 154.  See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 155.  Richard Wormset, Jim Crow Stories: The Brownsville Affair (1906), PBS.ORG, available 
at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories_events_browns.html (last visited Oct 6, 2013).  The 
official report on the incident, dated February 7, 1909, faulted a dozen of the soldiers as culprits.  
See Brownsville Incident, THEODORE ROOSEVELT CTR. AT DICKINSON ST. UNIV., 
www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/Themes/Race-Ethnicity-and-Gender/The-
Brownsville-Incident.aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2013).  A later investigation showed them to have 
been framed by deceitful white witnesses.  Id. 
 156.  See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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TIMECHART OF INTERBRANCH COMPARISON 
ON RACIAL MINORITIES POLICY157  
 
Query: In the first four decades after the Fourteenth Amendment en-
trenched “equal protection of the laws” for all “persons,” what role did each 
federal branch play in securing equal protection for unpopular racial minori-
ties? 
 
KEY: 
• + protective policies 
• - harmful policies 
• S. Ct. in italics 
• President and Executive Branch bold 
• CONGRESS in small caps 
• Cases coded in bold were brought by DOJ prosecutions on behalf of 
racial minority 
 
I. Asian Americans 1865–1874 
+ 1866: CONGRESS enacts the Civil Rights Act, extending to all per-
sons born in the United States American citizenship (except “Indians not 
taxed,” that is, reservation Indians); U.S. born Chinese thereby acquire U.S. 
civil rights. 
+ July 28, 1868: Through the Burlingame Treaty, President and 
SENATE grant China most favored nation status for its tourists and U.S. res-
idents. 
+ 1870 (§16 of May 31 Enforcement Act): CONGRESS extends most 
civil rights from the 1866 law not just to all citizens, but to all persons 
(within U.S. jurisdiction), and specifically forbids unequal taxation based 
on country of immigrant origin. 
-1870: CONGRESS in § 16 of May 31 Enforcement Act excludes rights 
to buy, sell, or lease property, which were guaranteed to citizens in § 18 of 
same Act. 
- 1870: CONGRESS in Naturalization Act adds Africans to whites as 
naturalizable citizens, but continues to omit Asians. 
 
 
II.  Native Americans 1865–1874 
                                                          
 157.  The events listed in the Timechart are discussed in the author’s forthcoming publication, 
see generally LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITY RACES, Chs.3–4 
(forthcoming 2016). 
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+ 1866: President and SENATE undo 1846 United States v. Rogers rul-
ing of Chief Justice Taney by new treaty with Cherokee that makes explicit 
the tribe’s power to extend its exclusive civil and criminal jurisdiction to 
white men by adopting them into the tribe. 
+ 1866: CONGRESS exempts “Indians not taxed” from U.S. citizenship 
in Civil Rights Act, thereby honoring tribal sovereignty. 
+1866: CONGRESS sends Fourteenth Amendment to states, exempting 
those Native Americans from U.S. citizenship who are “not [fully] subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States,” thereby honoring tribal sovereignty 
over reservation Indians. 
+1866: S. Ct. strikes down state taxes of both Kansas and New York 
on Native American tribes, on grounds that they conflict with prior treaties. 
+ +1869–1880: President Grant adopts two-step “Peace Policy” to 
eliminate fraud by Indian agents, replacing them with missionaries and ap-
pointing a Board of Commissioners, comprised of philanthropists, to super-
vise them.  Goal: avoid extinction of Native Americans by Christianizing 
them and teaching them how to survive through farming.  Policy also fol-
lowed by President Hayes. 
- March 3, 1871: CONGRESS forbids treaties with Native American 
tribes. 
- -May 1, 1871: S. Ct. (Cherokee Tobacco Tax Case) upholds execu-
tive branch application of a tobacco tax law in a way that violates terms of 
treaty with Cherokee. 
[1866–1890: Period of intermittent Native American wars in the West 
provoked by threat of Native American starvation]. 
 
III.  African Americans 1865–1876 
+ Dec.1865: Thirteenth Amendment ratified—CONGRESS & states. 
+ 1866: Civil Rights Act —CONGRESS. 
+ 1866: President & SENATE in treaty free all the African American 
slaves owned by Cherokee and grant them and their descendants all rights 
of native Cherokee. 
+ 1868: Fourteenth Amendment ratified by CONGRESS & states. 
+ 1870: Fifteenth Amendment ratified by CONGRESS & states. 
+ 1870: CONGRESS in Naturalization Act adds Africans to whites as 
naturalizable citizens. 
+ May 31, 1870: Enforcement Act (largely aimed at enforcing Fif-
teenth Amendment and punishing political terrorism in the South) ratified 
by CONGRESS. 
+ April 20, 1871: Ku Klux Klan Act (focused on acts for which Klan 
was notorious, such as “going in disguise on a public highway” with intent 
to deprive of civil rights) ratified by CONGRESS. 
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- 1872: S. Ct. in Blyew v. United States reads federal law narrowly, 
and avoids removing to federal courts cases where African Americans are 
refused right to serve as witnesses. 
+ 1873: S. Ct. in Railroad Co. v. Brown reads federal law broadly, re-
sulting in desegregating railroad in the District of Columbia and rejecting 
“separate but equal” argument. 
- Nov. 1874: U.S. public votes overwhelmingly to put Democrats in 
majority in HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 
-/+ Jan. 1875: Lame duck Republican CONGRESS adopts (watered 
down) Civil Rights Act (leaves schools segregated and mandates racial 
equality in access to public carriers, inns, and theaters, as well as racial non-
discrimination in access to juries). 
+ 1871–1877 Executive Branch brings hundreds of prosecutions an-
nually of Ku Klux Klan malefactors. See Graph supra p. 193. 
+/-- 1876: S. Ct. twists language of federal Enforcement Act (United 
States v. Reese) to strike down two sections.  Also dismisses several murder 
indictments as lacking proof of required racial motive (United States v. 
Cruikshank), but stretches language of Fifteenth Amendment to remove its 
apparent state action limitation (United States v. Cruikshank), establishing 
Fifteenth Amendment voting rights as national rights protectable against 
private action. 
+1876: S. Ct. in Walker v. Sauvinet upholds thousand dollar damages 
award (despite absence of jury trial) against white café owner for violating 
Louisiana law mandating equal access irrespective of race to public ac-
commodations (here a privately owned but state licensed café), when the 
café refused on racial grounds to serve an African American man. 
 
IV.  Asian Americans 1875–1908 
-/+ 1879: Bipartisan but more heavily Democrat CONGRESSIONAL ma-
jority votes for bill to alter Burlingame Treaty and limit Chinese worker 
immigration.  President Hayes (Republican) vetoes it successfully. 
- 1880: Both major party platforms (plus Greenback Labor Party) 
pledge to limit Chinese immigration. 
- Nov. 1880: China and United States sign new treaty endorsing “rea-
sonable” restrictions on immigration ratified by the President and SENATE. 
- 1881: President Chester A. Arthur (Republican Vice President who 
succeeded to the presidency) in annual message endorses restriction of Chi-
nese immigration. 
-/+ 1881: CONGRESS votes to restrict Chinese immigration for twenty 
years.  President Arthur successfully vetoes it as unreasonably extreme. 
- 1882: Chinese Exclusion Act suspends Chinese laborer immigration 
for ten years and denies entry to United States by wives of Chinese laborer 
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residents.  Reiterates prohibition on naturalization of Chinese.  Specifies 
that resident laborer Chinese people who leave the United States must show 
special federally issued I.D. card in order to re-enter.  Approved by 
CONGRESS. 
- July 1884: CONGRESS tightens procedures for ANY Chinese people 
wishing to enter the United States. 
+/- Dec.1884: S. Ct. re-admits Chew Heong to the United States on 
grounds that prior treaties allow his admission, despite DOJ argument that 
1884 Act barred his re-entry. 
+ 1886: S. Ct. in Yick Wo v. Hopkins declares void as violation of 
Equal Protection Clause a law applied against Chinese people but not 
against similarly situated Anglos. 
- Oct. 1, 1888: CONGRESS passes Scott Act, forbidding re-entry to 
United States by lawful Chinese laborer residents out of the country as of 
Oct. 1, 1888 and henceforth.   
- 1889: S. Ct. in Chae Chan Ping v. United States [Chinese Exclusion 
Case] upholds Scott Act despite its acknowledged conflict with prior treaty 
(follows reasoning of 1871 Cherokee Tobacco Tax case). 
+ March 14, 1892: S. Ct. in Lau Ow Bew v. United States reverses de-
cision of collector of the port of San Francisco (upheld at district and circuit 
court levels).  S. Ct. permits Chinese merchant, long resident in the United 
States, to re-enter without certificate from Chinese government that port 
collector wrongly believed the 1884 Act required. 
- May 5, 1892: CONGRESS in Geary Act § 1 extended Chinese laborer 
exclusion for ten more years; in §§ 2 and 3 said all resident Chinese “and 
persons of Chinese descent” (emphasis added) who could not satisfy a 
judge that their residence since May 5, 1892 was legal must be removed 
from the United States. 
- 1893: S. Ct. in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, despite three angry 
dissents, upholds §§ 2 and 3 of Geary Act. 
- 1894: CONGRESS in Appropriations [Chandler] Act removes judicial 
review from decisions by immigration bureaucrats; appeal on exclusion of 
aliens is only to Secretary of the Treasury. 
- 1895: S. Ct. in Lem Moon Sing v. United States upheld 1894 with-
drawal of judicial review from individual executive branch decisions to ex-
clude an alien. 
+ 1896: S.Ct. in Wong Wing v. United States strikes down as violation 
of due process § 4 of Geary Act that allowed sentencing for up to a year of 
imprisonment at hard labor prior to deportation of those Chinese who could 
not prove lawfulness of residency. 
+ /- 1898: S. Ct. in Wong Kim Ark v. United States upheld (against 
[Republican] DOJ arguments) the citizenship of a Chinese person born in 
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the United States, implicitly declaring unconstitutional the “and persons of 
Chinese descent” language of the Geary Act. 
- 1902: CONGRESS extended all prior bans on Chinese immigration in-
definitely. 
- 1904: CONGRESS re-enacted the already indefinite 1902 ban on Chi-
nese immigration. 
--/+ 1904, 1905, 1908: S. Ct. in Chin Yow v. United States (1908) 
amends 1904 (Sing Tuck) and 1905 (Ju Toy) decisions that had allowed ex-
ecutive discretion over refusals of re-entry to Chinese-descent person claim-
ing United States birth citizenship.  Now Chinese persons entitled to a “fair 
hearing” and, if denied, can obtain it by judicial review. 
+ 1905: President Theodore Roosevelt in annual message endorses 
racially non-discriminatory immigration policy, and threatens to veto 
CONGRESSIONAL exclusion of Japanese persons. 
+ 1908: S. Ct. in Liu Hop Fong v. United States interprets § 13 of the 
Act of 1888 (25 Stat. 476) to require a full district court hearing (de novo) 
on appeal of Commissioner decision (rather than mere review of the Com-
missioner’s hearing transcript) before deporting a Chinese person adjudged 
by the Commissioner to have been a laborer despite proper certificate from 
China affirming status of “student.” Ruled that certificate should be given 
legal effect unless competent evidence to the contrary is presented and also 
that Liu Hop Fong should be permitted to present evidence. 
[1898–1906: Labor shortage in California produces sharp increase in 
Japanese immigration.] 
+/- 1906–1908: President Theodore Roosevelt (prompted by Japa-
nese offense at placement in “colored” schools) negotiates for and 
CONGRESS authorizes a deal with Japan (“Gentleman’s Agreement”): Japa-
nese residents in San Francisco may attend the “white” school, but Japanese 
and Korean laborers may not immigrate to the United States (unless joining 
an immediate family member or already owning a farm in the United 
States). 
[1907–1909: Sharp decrease in Japanese immigration.] 
[-1917: CONGRESS bars ALL Asian immigration, including from the 
Middle East.] 
[- 1920s: S. Ct. upholds state prohibitions on landowning by Asians.] 
 
V.  Native Americans 1875–1908 
-/+ 1883: S. Ct. in Ex Parte Crow Dog rejects effort by Bureau of In-
dian Affairs (“BIA”) to impose Unites States criminal law on Native 
American reservations. 
- 1884: S. Ct. in Elk v. Wilkins ruled that non-reservation Native Amer-
icans (born on reservation within United States boundaries, living off reser-
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vation) do not have United States citizenship unless naturalized (Justices 
Harlan and Woods dissent). 
- 1885: CONGRESS accedes to request from Secretary of Interior by 
enacting Major Crimes Act removing Native American jurisdiction over 
(and federalizing) seven crimes, even if committed intra-tribally on reserva-
tion. 
- 1886: S. Ct. in United States v. Kagama upheld the Major Crimes Act 
despite its conflict with prior treaties (see Cherokee Tobacco Tax Case). 
-/+ 1887: CONGRESS passes Dawes Act arranging for individual allot-
ments (alienable within twenty-five years) of heretofore tribal land and also 
for selling off “surplus” tribal lands, resulting in 80% of land value belong-
ing to Native Americans lost to them by 1934.  Act corrects Elk v. Wilkins 
error by bestowing citizenship on all Native Americans who take an allot-
ment or take up life away from the tribe, and adopt “habits of civilized life.” 
+ 1896: S. Ct. rules that tribal sovereignty exempts tribal governments 
from restrictions of the Bill of Rights in dealing with tribal members (Tal-
ton v. Mayes). 
-/+ 1896: S. Ct. in Ward v. Racehorse upheld state-level regulations of 
Native American hunting on federal land that contradicted guarantee in pri-
or treaty; appeared to turn away from the precedents of Kansas and New 
York Indians cases of 1866.  U.S. Attorney General is counsel for Race-
horse. 
- 1898: CONGRESS in Curtis Act (June 28) extends Dawes Act to cover 
the Five Civilized tribes (previously exempted due to agricultural success), 
contrary to extant treaty and property law, resulting in the immiseration of 
previously prosperous tribes.  Also authorizes (in § 13) Secretary of Inte-
rior to issue mineral leases on tribal land with monetary proceeds to go to 
tribal benefit. 
- 1899: S. Ct. in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation upholds aspect of the 
Curtis and Dawes Acts that lets Dawes Commission determine who is a 
tribal member for purposes of land allotment. 
- 1902: S. Ct. in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock upholds legislative 
grant of authority (in Curtis and Dawes Acts) to Secretary of Interior to 
issue mineral leases on tribal land with monetary proceeds to go to tribal 
benefit. 
-- 1903: S. Ct. in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock upholds selloff and allotment 
of tribal land in a treaty, which the HOUSE favored but slipped through the 
SENATE in 1900 by subterfuge, despite clear conflict with treaty law and 
massive evidence of fraudulent dealing by non-Native Americans and of 
opposition to the sale by tribal membership.  (In 1901, President McKinley 
had already announced that the lands were open for [white] settlement.) 
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++ 1905: S. Ct. in United States v. Winans rules that Native American 
fishing rights preserved in prior federal treaty prevail over later state regula-
tions (turning its back on Racehorse, 1896). DOJ defends tribal treaty 
rights. 
+ 1905: S. Ct. in In re Heff forbids CONGRESS to prohibit sale of liquor 
to only Native Americans, saying that they must be treated as equal citi-
zens, having become citizens via the Dawes Act allotment process. 
- 1906: CONGRESS (provoked by In re Heff) in Burke Act postpones 
Native American citizenship during the twenty-five years of federal land 
supervision, with power in Secretary of Interior to shorten individual su-
pervision periods. 
++ 1908: S. Ct. in Winters v. United States upholds tribal rights to di-
vert streams for navigation on grounds of prior federal treaty in the face of 
contrary state law (staying with its 1905 Winans logic on fishing rights.) 
DOJ defends Native American treaty against state law. 
 
 
 
VI.  African Americans 1876–1903 
[In 1874, Democrats gain control in the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
and not until 1889 do Republicans again control both CONGRESSIONAL 
branches plus the Presidency; Until 1889, the closest is 1881–1882 when 
Democrats nonetheless have 50% of SENATE, with easy filibuster.] 
+ 1876–1885: Executive branch prosecutions for electoral terrorism 
in the South continue in significant numbers but in lower numbers than 
peak years of 1872–1874. 
+ 1877: Chief Justice Waite on circuit in United States v. Butler up-
held ten convictions of private persons for racially discriminatory vote-
discouraging violence. 
- 1878: S. Ct. in Hall v. de Cuir invalidates Louisiana statute forbid-
ding race discrimination in common carriers as violation of Commerce 
Clause if applied (even within state) to interstate carriers. 
+ 1880: S. Ct. in Ex Parte Siebold rejects argument that state officials 
(of Baltimore, Maryland) may not be held accountable in federal courts for 
obedience to federal election laws. 
+ 1880: S. Ct. in Strauder v. West Virginia declared unconstitutional 
state law that restricted jury service to white males. 
+ 1880: S. Ct. in Ex Parte Virginia upheld conviction of a state offi-
cial for federal crime of excluding African Americans from jury lists on ac-
count of race, under §4 of 1875 Civil Rights Act, which it also upheld. 
+ 1881: S. Ct. in Neal v. Delaware rejected as beyond credibility claim 
of Delaware officials that zero of the 26,000 African Americans residents 
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qualified for jury duty as “sober and judicious persons”; ruled the criminal 
trial in question unconstitutional. 
+ 1883: S. Ct. in Bush v. Kentucky threw out indictment for murder by 
an African American of a white, on grounds that African Americans had 
been excluded from consideration for grand jury service, pursuant to state 
law in force at time of the indictment. 
- 1883: S. Ct. in Civil Rights Cases declares unconstitutional the pub-
lic accommodations provisions of 1875 Civil Rights Act because they fail 
to specify that unequal treatment by the state or its officials is what is for-
bidden.  Merely private action is ruled not punishable under Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
- 1883: S. Ct. in United States v. Harris declares unconstitutional 
§5519 of the federal code because it allowed punishment of merely private 
persons, rather than state officials, for denying “equal protection of the 
laws.” 
+ 1884: S. Ct. in Ex Parte Yarborough upheld convictions of private 
persons for violent interference with Fifteenth Amendment rights (that is, 
no state action required for conviction.). 
+/- 1889–1890: The Republican HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES passed 
the Hoar-Lodge bill, which would have sent federal enforcement officials to 
the South to secure voting rights for African Americans.  Action in the 
SENATE was blocked by filibuster of Democrats until, during the lame duck 
session, a handful of Republican SENATORS voted with the Democrats to 
bring up a new subject.  In 1890 the Democrats again took control in 
CONGRESS. 
- 1890: S. Ct. in Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v. Mis-
sissippi, upholds Mississippi law requiring separate cars for whites and Af-
rican Americans in in-state common carriers (despite the 1878 case of Hall 
v. deCuir), as not undue burden on interstate commerce. 
- 1890: S. Ct. in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. Kentucky upholds 
Kentucky law requiring separate cars for whites and African Americans in 
in-state common carriers (despite Hall v. deCuir), as not undue burden on 
interstate commerce. 
- 1891: S. Ct. in In re Wood on procedural grounds (wrong writ, wrong 
timing) refuses to examine allegation that New York courts have been ex-
cluding African Americans from juries and thereby denying equal protec-
tion. 
- 1893–1894: Both houses of CONGRESS and the Presidency were fi-
nally controlled by the Democrats.  They legislated in 1894 to rescind the 
federal provisions that enforced voting rights in the South.  Republicans had 
turned their attention away from African Americans, to economic issues, 
and did not filibuster. 
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- 1895: S. Ct. in Mills v. Green refused to invalidate procedures used in 
South Carolina to keep African Americans from voting for state constitu-
tional convention, ruling that the election was finished, so the issue was 
moot. 
- 1895: S. Ct. in Andrews v. Swartz refuses to examine allegation of ra-
cial exclusion from jury, claiming procedural error. 
-- 1896: S. Ct. in Gibson v. Mississippi, Smith v. Mississippi, and Mur-
ray v. Louisiana refuses to examine allegation of racial exclusion from jury, 
claiming procedural error. 
- 1896: S. Ct. in Plessy v. Ferguson permitted a state law that required 
“separate but equal” accommodations on railway cars for white and non-
white races, ignoring “state action” logic of earlier Civil Rights Cases (of 
1883). 
-- 1898: S. Ct. genuinely turned its back on Reconstruction.  In Wil-
liams v. Mississippi claimed that the Mississippi law, which in application 
deprived the vast majority of African Americans of the vote, and of jury el-
igibility, was not close enough to the bias in application of Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins to be judged unconstitutional. 
- 1899: S. Ct. ruled in Cummings v. Board of Education that county did 
not violate equal protection when it closed the only African American high 
school but continued to run one for white girls and subsidize one for Afri-
can American boys. 
+/- 1900: S. Ct. in Carter v. Texas remands to state courts to permit 
convicted murderer to show evidence that selection of the grand juries for 
many years in his county deliberately excluded qualified African Americans 
on grounds of race; his fate still left to state courts. 
- 1900: S. Ct. in Wiley v. Sinkler rejects damages suit from South Caro-
linian against a voting official who refused to allow him to vote.  Despite 
claim he was “in every respect duly qualified” to vote in elections in South 
Carolina. S. Ct. relied on his neglect to claim in court that he was a regis-
tered voter. 
- 1903: S. Ct. in Tarrance v. Florida rejects claim of racial exclusion 
from jury, saying proof absent. 
- 1903: S.Ct. in Brownfield v. South Carolina rejects claim of racial 
exclusion from jury, saying proof absent despite allegation that county was 
80% African American. 
- 1903: S. Ct. in Giles v. Harris, despite being shown fact pattern as 
egregious as that of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, refuses to declare Alabama voting 
law unconstitutional either per se or as administered and instead says that 
only the elected branches are powerful enough to deal with an intransigent 
state. 
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- 1903: S. Ct. in James v. Bowman ignores rules that have been in 
place since Reese and Cruikshank and declares that Fifteenth Amendment 
can be violated only by state, not private, officials. 
++ 1903: President Theodore Roosevelt’s DOJ indicted two groups 
of whites for threatening and violently intimidating African American 
workers to leave their jobs and move away.  The first, United States v. 
Morris, charged eleven whites with intimidating African American share-
croppers.  The jury did not convict.  The second, United States v. Maples, 
charged fifteen white men with intimidating eight African American 
sawmill workers to leave their jobs, and the jury convicted three.  The 
charge was that these white men violated §§ 1977 and 5508 by conspiring 
to use violence and threats to deprive eight named African Americans of the 
Thirteenth Amendment right to contract freely to dispose of their labor.  
The appeal of this case became the 1906 United States v. Hodges. 
- 1904: S. Ct. in Giles v. Teasley refuses to grant either damages or a 
writ of mandamus to correct alleged mass violations of the Fifteenth 
Amendment by Alabama voting registrars. 
- 1904: S. Ct. in Jones v. Montague rejects an appeal from African 
Americans denied voting rights by the 1901 Constitution of Virginia on the 
grounds that the congressional election of 1902 was completed, so the case 
was moot. 
+/- 1904: S. Ct. in Rogers v. Alabama reverses and remands to state 
courts for proceedings that will allow convicted murderer to present evi-
dence that grand jury was selected in ways that deliberated excluded quali-
fied African Americans; defendant’s fate still left to state authorities. 
-/++ 1905: S. Ct. reverses the conviction for peonage in Clyatt v. Unit-
ed States due to wrong wording in the indictment and remands for retrial.  
Upheld 1867 federal law against peonage. 
++ 1905: S. Ct. in Riggins v. United States ruled that federally con-
victed member of mob that had lynched an African American man could 
not use procedure of writ of habeas corpus. 
++ 1906 S. Ct. ruled in Shipp v. United States (I) that contempt of 
court charge could issue from the Supreme Court against sheriff and depu-
ties and mob participants for cooperating in a lynch mob that killed an Afri-
can American man whose appeal was pending in the Supreme Court. 
- 1906: S .Ct. in Thomas v. Texas rejects claim of jury exclusion, 
claiming evidence absent. 
+ 1906: President Theodore Roosevelt’s DOJ indicted another group 
of Arkansas whites for violently intimidating a group of African American 
workers to leave their railroad jobs.  Case became the 1907 case of Boyett v. 
United States. 
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- 1906: S. Ct. ruled in United States v. Hodges that federal government 
does not have power under Thirteenth Amendment to punish a private crim-
inal conspiracy to use violence to intimidate African American (or others) 
out of freely contracting for a job, and threw out the criminal convictions 
for having done so. 
- 1907: S. Ct. relied on Hodges to rule per curiam in Boyett v. United 
States (1907), to invalidate the criminal convictions of intimidators of Afri-
can American railroad workers. 
-/+ 1908: S. Ct. in Bailey v. Alabama disagrees with amicus from DOJ 
and refuses to issue pretrial release on habeas of an African American man 
jailed under a peonage law. 
- 1908: S. Ct. in Berea College v. Kentucky upheld state law forbidding 
even private corporations to educate African Americans and whites togeth-
er. 
++ 1909: S. Ct. in United States v. Shipp (II) finds guilty on the 
charge of contempt of court a sheriff, one deputy, and four private parties 
based on evidence of their cooperation and participation in lynching an Af-
rican American man whose appeal they knew was pending in the Supreme 
Court. 
